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Abstract
The Internet-based market is rising as a viable
venue for the procurement of innovation solutions.
There are two major procurement mechanisms
existing in the market practices: contest and RFP.
We investigate the factors that affect a firm’s
preference of one mechanism over the other. We
divide innovation problems into two categories:
exploitive innovation problem and exploratory
innovation problem. For an exploitive innovation
problem, technologies used in solutions already
exist, and the outcome of the solution is determined
by the type and the effort of a solver. For an
exploratory problem, technologies are not available;
solvers need to go through an exploratory process
but the result of his effort is uncertain. We establish
the boundary condition for solution seeker’s
decision on procurement mechanism. For an
exploitive innovation problem, RFP is preferred in
an open-participation market unless the distribution
of the solvers’ type has a big variance; for an
explorative innovation problem, contest will be
preferred in most cases except that the solver pool
of the market is small. Moreover, the amount of a
cash award, the effort coefficient, and the degree of
the randomness endowed in a technology
exploratory process all have effect on seekers’
decision.
Keywords: Internet-based innovation markets,
contest, RFP, open innovation

Introduction
In a world of the distributed knowledge, firms and
institutions need to leverage outsiders’ wisdom to
solve their own innovation problems. Instead of
solving the problem completely in-house, they have
begun to either work with outside partners or
procure solutions from market. This movement is
termed as open innovation by Chesbrough (2002).
With the involvement of the Internet, the open
innovation has grown more open to participants
and to various scopes, because the Internet not only
creates a viable environment for innovators to
communicate and collaborate with each other but
also incubates a variety of markets to embrace all
sorts of innovation problems.
Some procurement markets for innovation
have emerged in recent years. InnoCentive, as one

of the best-known online innovation markets, takes
up innovation problems in a broad range of domain
such as computer science, chemistry, physical
sciences, life sciences, etc. The problems that come
from the “seekers” who are either companies, or
non-profit organizations or public sectors are
opened up to the “solvers” who are scientists,
researchers or innovators. As of 2008 InnoCentive
had 64 of these seekers posting more than 800
problems in 40 disciplines. More than 300 of them
have already been solved by over 165,000 solvers.1
Contest is the main transaction mechanism used in
InnoCentive, in which the solver with the best
solution wins cash award. Another transaction
mechanism is RFP (known as eRFP in InnoCentive)
which allows a seeker to submit a Request for
Proposal to the solver’s community. After a number
of solvers turn in RFP responses, the seeker will
select the best RFP response by his evaluation and
contact its submitter for further development.
Contest and RFP are the most common
mechanisms for innovation procurement. Some
markets apply both of them (e.g. InnoCentive),
while others adopt only one (e.g. Innovation
Exchange uses Contest and NineSigma uses eRFP).
Specifically, contests used in these markets are
tournaments that reward the provider of the best
solution on a specific date. In the tournament, a
solution is pre-prepared by a solver. If it does not
rise as the best solution, all the costs spent on the
solution will be sunk. In contrast, RFP eliminates
the sunk costs by choosing proposals rather than
fully completed solutions. The provider of the best
proposals will be rewarded with a contract to
develop his proposal into a solution. Although to
prepare proposals generates cost, it is much less
costing than the full development of a solution.
Economists have long believed that
innovation is uncontractable because its inputs are
unobservable and its outcomes can hardly be
verified by a court. Though, the adoption of RFP by
real innovation markets reveals that at least some
of the innovations can be contracted, and under
certain circumstances, RFP works better than
contest as an innovation procurement mechanism.
However, it is unclear in which types of
innovations and under what circumstances RFP
1
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outperforms contest or vice versa. Our paper aims
to address those questions.
In our paper, we view innovation as a
process of searching over some poorly understood
knowledge landscape (Simon and Newell 1962;
Levinthal 1997). We divide the unknown landscape
into two areas. One is associated with not knowing
who the best solver of a problem is; the other is
associated with missing technologies to solve
problems. We define the problems in the former
area as exploitive innovation problems and in the
latter as exploratory innovation problems. For an
exploitive innovation problem, technologies are
ready. The objective of seekers is to find the right
solver who makes the best use of the technologies.
For an exploratory innovation, in contrast,
technologies do not exist yet and the seekers must
drive solvers to invent them. The quality of the
final solutions for both problems is characterized
with uncertainty. The uncertainty in exploitive
problems is related to the endowed characteristics
of solvers; while the uncertainty in exploratory
problems mainly lies in the random results of
inventions.
Let us take a real case as an example. The
Oil Recovery Institute needed to find a new and
novel way to get oil of the bottom of the ocean near
Alaska. They could get the oil off the bottom and
onto the barges, but the surface temperature drops
so dramatically that the oil solidifies and cannot be
pumped through the barge system. The solver
ended up being an engineer who solved that
problem using a common technology in the
construction industry. He recognized that problem
was very similar to the problem of keeping cement
liquid while people pouring a foundation. Thus, he
suggested the Institute to use vibrating equipment
on the barges to keep the oil fluid enough. In this
case, the technology is already available, and the
winner is who recognized it. Therefore, we
categorize this problem as an exploitive innovation
problem. For another instance, the Prize4Life
foundation featured a $1 million award for finding
a biomarker that measures ALS disease progression,
in which case the technology was not unavailable
and solvers needed to invent it. Therefore, from our
perspective, it is an exploratory innovation
problem.
In our paper, we model two types of
innovation problems and study each problem of
under which conditions a seeker will prefer to RFP
or vice versa. We find that in an exploitive
innovation problem, a seeker’s decision is affected
by both the size and the diversity of the solver pool
in the market, and also that the value of the
problem which is presented by the amount of cash
awards influences seekers’ preference to a
mechanism. In an exploratory innovation problem,
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the main influential factor is the number of solvers
and the randomness of the exploratory process. The
trade-off behind the choice between contest and
RFP is related to the advantage and the side-effect a
contest has in a given setting. When the advantages
overwhelm the side-effects, contest is preferred,
otherwise, RFP wins out.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. We first review the relevant literature, then
develop the models and establish our main results.
Finally, we conclude the paper.

Literature Review
There is a set of papers focusing on the optimal
tournament design in R&D settings (e.g., [2] [4] [5]
[8] [11]). All of these papers find that allowing
open participation in tournaments mitigate
sponsors’ profits, because the fierce competition
between solvers causes their underinvestment in
effort. To reduce this inefficiency, Taylor (1995)
suggests sponsors restricting participation by taxing
contestants through an entry fee [11]; Fullerton and
McAfee (1999) demonstrate that an all-pay auction
for the entry fee is efficient to select the most
qualified contestants for competition [4]; Fullerton
et al. (2002) shows that conducting auctions at the
end of research tournaments will generally reduce
the sponsor's prize expenditure relative to
fixed-prize tournaments [5]. However, Terwiesch
and Xu (2008) have an arguing result. They
analyze three types of innovation project: a)
expertise-based project, b) ideation project and c)
trial-and-error project, and demonstrate that for all
the types of innovation, the seeker can benefit from
open-participation contest “because he can obtain a
more diverse set of solutions, which mitigates and
sometimes outweighs the effect of the solvers’
underinvestment in effort” [12]. Unlike this stream
of literature, our paper not only discusses the effect
of the number of participants on seekers’ profit but
also provides a new insight into the effect of the
distribution characteristics of participants.
Moreover, Terwiesch and Xu (2008)
compared the quality of the solutions and the
seekers’ profits in a contest and in an internal
innovation. They suggested that the benefit of
contest is enabling seekers to find solvers with low
effort cost, while the ineffiency of contest is
causing the underinvestment in the solvers’ effort.
They further demonstrated if the external solver’s
effort cost is lower than certain level, open contest
is a better choice than internal innovation. On and
beyond Terwiesch and Xu (2008), our paper
concerns seekers’ choice between two procurement
mechanisms: contest and RFP. Assuming that
seekers are able to find solvers at the same effort
cost in these two mechanisms, to reach the low cost
solver is no longer the only benefit out of contest.
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Thus, the reason behind a choice decision on
contest or RFP is different from that on contest and
internal innovation.
Another relevant literature stream is related
to the research on RFP. In the real world, RFP is
widely used in product procurement. The process is
usually regarded as a multi-attribute auction in
academy (e.g. [1] [10]). However, in our paper, we
abstract the process into a model of price-only
auction in which seekers set compulsory quality
requirements for all the bidding solvers to accept.
Based on our observation, the problems posted in
real innovation markets are describable with the
explicit quality requirements on solutions.
Therefore, we believe that our price-only model
does not reduce the explanation power of our
results. More specifically, we assume that solvers
compete for contract via the Vickrey second-bid
auction in RFPs. This assumption is based on two
facts. First, we have observed many English
auctions in real innovation markets. Second, the
outcome of the English auctions can be achieved
by Vickrey auction, and it is customary to model an
English auction as a Vickery auction [7].

Model Development
A seeker procures a problem solution from n
solvers. All parties are risk-neutral. The value of a
solution is determined by three variables, solvers’
type, solvers’ effort and a random noise. A solver’s
type is a combination of all his/her endowed
characteristics related to solving the problem, such
as experience, education, intelligence, etc. A
solver’s effort is the investment s/he puts into the
problem, which usually refers to time and research
resources. Besides the type and effort of solvers, all
the other factors that influence the value of a
solution are regarded as the random noise.
Formally, the value of a solution Vi can be written
as a linear function of solvers’ type βi, solvers’
effort return r(ei) and a random variable ξi:
Vi = β i + r (ei ) + ξ i , i = 1, 2, ..., n
(1)
βi is independently distributed across solvers with a
commonly known, continuous and increasing
cumulative density function F(βi). r(ei) is either
linear or concave in ei. The cost of the solution is
linear in effort with a constant unit cost c. ξi is an
IID Gumbel random variable with mean zero and
scale parameter μ. A higher μ means a higher
degree of randomness. βi is private information of
solver i; c and μ are commonly-known information.
A contest has three stages. Firstly, a seeker
posts a problem and announces a cash award, A, for
the best solution. Secondly, solvers first decide how
much effort to exert on the problem and then work
out the solution. Finally, after all the solvers

submitted their solutions, the seeker selects the best
solution and pays the prize to its solver. Let V1,
V2, …, Vn, denote the rank-ordered values of
solutions, where V1≥V2≥…≥Vn. The profit of the
seeker (the subscript c stands for contest) is
Π c = V1 − A
(2)
In a RFP, which is assumed as a Vickrey
auction in our paper, a seeker firstly posts a
problem and specifies the standard value, V, of the
solution. Then, according to the value requirement,
solvers decide how much to bid for the problem.
The seeker will choose the lowest bidder as the
winner and pay him the second lowest bid. A
solver’s optimal bidding truly reveals its cost. Let
C1, C2, …, Cn , denote the rank-ordered costs of the
solvers, where C1≤C2≤…≤Cn. The profit of the
seeker using a Vickrey auction (the subscript r
stands for RFP) is
Π r = V − C2
(3)
As we can see, a seeker’s profit function is
the value of the winning solution minus the reward
paid to the winner. Assuming the seeker pays the
same rewards to the winners in contest and RFP
(A=C2), we can compare the performance of the
two mechanisms by examining the expected values
of their winning solutions (V1 and V). For
consistency, we denote Vc as the value of winning
solution in contests and Vr as the value in RFP.

Mechanism Comparison in Exploitive
Innovation
As we defined, an exploitive innovation problem
has available technologies and the uncertainty of
the quality of its solution lies on the characteristic
of its solver. Assuming the value of a solution
equals to its quality, we believe that the solution
value in an exploitive innovation problem is only
driven by the type and effort of solvers. Terwiesch
and Xu (2008) define this kind of innovation as
expertise-based projects.
Vi = β i + r (ei )
(4)
In a contest, for a given solver i, the
probability for him to win the contest equals to the
probability that the solver offers the solution with
highest value. Let Pi (βi, F(βi), n) denotes the
probability of the solver i offering the best solution.
Thus, each solver solves:
Max E[π i (βi )] ≡ π i = APi (βi , F (βi ), n) − cei , (5)
ei

s.t. π i ≥ 0
We assume ei is increasing with βi and r(ei)=θei, in
which θ is defined as effort coefficient. Vi increases
with, therefore,
Pi ( β i , F ( β ), n ) = F

n −1

(βi )
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reward to the winners of the two mechanisms. The
condition can be written as
A = C2

The problem of solver i can be written as
Max
ei ( β i )

π i = AF

n −1

( β i ) − cei ( β i ), s.t. π i ≥ 0

(7)

Substituting (13) into the above equation yields:
A
Vr = V = β 2 + θ ⋅
(14)
c
For tractability, we make a specific parametric
distributional assumption. In the following text, we
assume that the solvers’ types are distributed
uniformly on [R-s, R+s], where R≥s>0. As shown
in most statistic texts, the density of the kth order
statistic is given by

The first order condition of solver i’s problem is
∂β i
n−2
−c = 0
A( n − 1) F ( β i ) f ( β i )
*
∂ (ei ( β i ))
which can be rearranged as
*

∂ ( ei ( β i ))
∂β i

=

A( n − 1) F

n−2

(βi ) f (βi )

c

We assume βi ∈ [β0, β1]. Since Vi increases with βi,
the solver with the lowest type has no probability to
win and will not exert any effort in equilibrium, i.e.,
e(β0) = 0. Solving the differential equation with this
boundary condition, we have the symmetric
Bayesian equilibrium strategy for a solver as
*

ei ( β i ) =

A( n − 1)
c

∫

βi

β0

F ( x)

n−2

f ( x ) dx =

A
c

F

n −1

(βi )

f X ( x) =
(k)

(8)

Since F(β) is continuous and increasing in βi , we
can verify that e(βi) is increasing in βi, which is
consistent with our assumption. Substituting (8)
into (7) yields
A n −1
*
n −1
π i = AF ( β i ) − c ⋅ [ F ( β i )] = 0 (9)
c
Let β1, β2, …, βn, denote the rank-ordered types of
the solvers, where β1≥β2≥…≥βn. Since Vi increases
with βi, the solver whose type is βi creates the
solution with the highest value V1:
Vc = V1 = β1 + e1 ( β1 )

=

∫

β1

β0

[ β i + θ ei (β i )]nF ( β i )

n −1

f (βi )d βi

(10)

In a RFP, the expected value of submitted solutions
is equal to the standard quality requested by the
seeker. Therefore, the expected effort a solver will
exert to solve the problem can be written as
V − βi
(11)
ei ( β i ) =
θ
So, the expected cost of solver i is
V − βi
(12)
Ci = cei ( β i ) = c ⋅
θ

n!
( k − 1)!( n − k )!

F ( x)

n−k

(1 − F ( x ))

k −1

f ( x)

Based on this density, we can derive the expected
value of βi.
n − i +1
βi = ( R − s) + 2s ⋅
(15)
n +1
Substituting (15) into (10) and (8), we have
Vc = β1 + θ ⋅

A

⋅

n

c 2n − 1

Vr = β 2

+θ ⋅

= ( R − s) + 2s ⋅

A
c

n
n +1

= ( R − s) + 2s ⋅

+θ ⋅

n −1
n +1

A

n

⋅

c 2n − 1

+θ ⋅

A
c

Proposition 1.
For a exploitive innovation
problem, let r(ei)=θei be the solvers’ effort return
function and consider a market with n solvers
whose types are distributed uniformly on [R-s, R+s],
where R≥s>0. Given the award to winner is A, and
the unit cost of solvers’ effort is c, (a) the seeker
can get the highest solution value, R+s+θA/c, by
using RFP mechanism in a market with a very large
solver pool; (b) the condition for contest
outperforms RFP is
1
A 1− n
>0
⋅ 2s + θ ⋅ ⋅
n +1
c 2n − 1

Therefore, the payment for the winner in the
Vickrey auction, which is equal to C2 , can be
written as
V − β2
C2 = c ⋅
(13)
θ
As we supposed before, we compare the expected
value the seeker obtains when s/he pays the same
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Figure 1. The Seeker’s Optimal Choice for
Exploitive Innovation Problems

Illustrated in Figure 1 is the seeker’s
optimal choice of the procurement mechanism for
exploitive innovation problems. As demonstrated in
Proposition 1 and Figure 1, for certain number of
solvers, there is a threshold level of the variance of
solver’s type. When the variance of solver’s type is

below the threshold, RFP will help the seeker get a
better solution than contest does. The threshold
increases in a growing number of the solvers
implying that the larger the size of a solver pool,
the more likely RFP outperforms contest. In
addition, Figure 1 reveals that the ratio of the
payment to winner to the unit cost of effort (A/c)
has an effect on the seeker’s choice. If we
normalize the unit cost to 1, the ratio equals to the
payment amount. Thus, we may conclude that the
more a seeker is willing to pay for a solution, the
more likely s/he prefers RFP to contest. In addition,
the effort coefficient (θ) has the similar effect, i.e.,
the bigger the effort coefficient, the more likely the
seeker chooses RFP.
Equations (7) and (8) demonstrate the
co-existence of the advantage and the side-effect in
contest. The advantage is that it can exploit the
highest type value of solvers in a pool while RFP
only gets the second highest. The side-effect is the
underinvestment of effort due to solvers’ fear of
sunk costs. When the advantage exceeds the
side-effect, Contest is preferred; otherwise RFP. In
contest, the increase in the number of solvers
weakens the chance for a solver to win and causes
the solver to be more cautious to invest. Thus, the
enlargement of a solver pool will aggravate the
side-effect of Contest. On the contrary, the increase
of the variance of solvers’ type will enhance the
advantage of the contest, because with a larger
variance, the gap between the highest value and the
second highest value is more significant. We
conclude that both the size and the diversity of a
solver pool will affect the performance of contest
and, consequently, seeker’s preference to contest or
RFP.
As discussed, contest is superior in solver’s
type while RFP is superior in solver’s effort and
consequently superior in the return of the effort.
Therefore, if the return of the effort accounts for
the most value of the solution, RFP will probably
outperform contest. The more to be paid for the
solution, the larger the solvers’ effort is induced.
Ceteris paribus, the return of the effort will have a
larger proportion in the solution value. Meanwhile,
the increase of the effort coefficient will also
enlarge the proportion. Therefore, in a setting with
large rewards and high effort coefficient, RFP
outperforms contest.

Mechanism Comparison in Exploratory
Innovation
In an exploratory innovation, there are huge
technology uncertainties. To emphasize the
technology uncertainty, we assume all the solvers
are identical. The difference of the value of
solutions mainly depends on the random noise
existed in the process of technology exploration.
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Terwiesch and Xu (2008) define this kind of
innovation as ideation projects.
Vi = β + r (ei ) + ξ i
In a contest, the winning probability of
solver i is

Pro{i wins the contest} =

function and consider a Gumbel random variable
with mean zero and scale parameter μ. In a market
with n solvers, (a) only when θ/μ≤n(n-1), the
solvers will consider participating in a contest; (b)
the condition for contest outperforms RFP is
μ

μ ⎛ 1 ⎞θ

1

⎛ r(e) − r(ei ) ⎞
1 + (n −1)exp ⎜
⎟
μ
⎝
⎠

(16)

n −1

⎜ ⎟ − 2 >0
θ ⎝n⎠
n

e is the effort exerted by all the other solvers except
solver i. We assume they exert the same effort. As
for the detailed explanation of Equation (16), we
refer interested readers to Terwiesch and Xu (2008).
Consequently, the profit of the solver i can be
written as
1
πi = A ⋅
− cei
⎛ r (e) − r (ei ) ⎞
1 + ( n − 1) exp ⎜
⎟

⎝

μ

⎠

Assuming symmetry e=ei and r(ei)=θlnei, we have
the first-order condition
Aθ ( n − 1)
ei =
2
cμ n
The winning solution of the contest has the highest
value of random variable, thus
Vc = V1 = β + θ ln ei + max(ξ i )
= β + θ ln

Aθ ( n − 1)

+ μ ln n
(17)
2
cμ n
As shown in the above equation, the competition
introduced by contest produces two effects. On the
one hand, it causes underinvestment of effort,
which has been discussed before. On the other hand,
it exploits the advantage of multiple solver trials
which may produce a random value larger than the
zero mean.
With the strategy ei , the profit of the solver is
⎛ 1 θ n −1 ⎞
πi = A⋅⎜ − ⋅ 2 ⎟
⎝n μ n ⎠
In order to make sure that the profit of the solver is
no less than zero, we obtain solvers’ participation
constrain
n
θ
≤
μ n −1
In a RFP project, since all the solvers are identical,
the seeker can choose anyone of them to procure a
solution of value V with a payment of
cexp[(V-β)/θ], thus
A
(18)
VR = V = β + θ ln
c
Proposition 2. For an exploratory innovation
problem, let r(ei)=θlnei be the solvers’ effort return

Figure 2. The Seeker’s Optimal Choice for
Exploratory Innovation Problems
Figure 2 shows that in an exploratory
problem, only when the number of solvers is very
small, seekers will prefer RFP to contest.
Meanwhile, if the random variable has a higher
degree of randomness, contest is more likely to
outperform RFP. However, with the increase of the
effort coefficient, the chance for RFP to win is
enhanced.
Comparing Equation (10) and (11), we find
the advantage of a contest is that a seeker gets
higher value of the random variable because s/he
selects the best one from many proposals proposed
by a group of contestants, while in a RFP a seeker
merely accepts the result produced by one
contracted solver. However, in this case, contest
has the same side-effect as it has in exploitive
problems. The solvers who participate in the
Contests may underinvest their efforts because they
fear of getting no reward at all. Although the size of
solver pool has positive effect on both the
advantage and the side-effect, it will induce more
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advantage than side-effect when it is sized up, thus,
the advantage will be dominant. Moreover, when
the effort coefficient increases, the effort will
account more for the value of the solution and
consequently the side-effect of the contest becomes
more influential to the solution value. Then, RFP
will have more chances to win contest when other
factors are fixed.

Discussion and Conclusions
A growing number of firms have embraced the idea
of open innovation: looking for ideas and solutions
from the outside world. The Internet provides an
unparalleled venue for the exchange of virtual
knowledge products. E-market has emerged for
firms to procure solutions for their innovation
problems. However, these markets support different
procurement mechanisms and hold solver pools
with different quality and quantity characteristics.
It is critical for firms to understand which
procurement mechanism they should use under
certain circumstances.
In an exploitive innovation problem, if a
market has a small number of diversified solvers,
the seeker (the firm) should use a contest to exploit
the full value of the highest solver type. On the
contrary, if a market has a large number of similar
solvers, the seeker should adopt RFP to obtain
solvers’ full investment of efforts. Moreover, if the
seeker is willing to pay a high reward to the best
solution, s/he should choose RFP, since it can
induce the best solution of much higher level than
contest does. For an exploratory innovation
problem, in most cases, a seeker should choose
contest unless the size of the solver pool is really
small (e.g. n<5), or the value of the solution is
mainly determined by the effort of solvers rather
than the random outcome of the exploratory
process.
Although we obtain some explicit results in
this paper, there are more questions open to further
research. We have observed that solvers’ profit
varies in different procurement mechanisms. It
causes solvers’ preference to certain mechanism. It
will be interesting to find how this preference
influences market structure and seekers’ behavior.
Moreover, in exploitive innovation problems,
seekers’ decisions on procurement mechanisms
heavily rely on their knowledge of the distribution
of solvers’ type. An attention is worth in how the
information disclosure policy increases seeker’s
knowledge on the solver’s type distribution which
in return affects seekers’ decisions. Empirical
research may be conducted to analyze how seekers
choose procurement mechanisms in practice and
which factors affect their decisions. We believe that

the Internet-based innovation markets will play a
significant role in open innovation, but merely a
little of these markets has been fully explored. The
vast grey portions on the map of the innovation
market are left to continuous endeavoring efforts.
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